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ABSTRACT 
The NPS Tactical Horizon Extension Project objective is to define and 
demonstrate a concept by which task force-level commanders and below can obtain a 
persistent, over-the-horizon surveillance capability for the purpose of target development 
and other missions without tasking national or theater-level assets.  Our goal is to 
increase the ISR capacity of units who normally would not rate the priority to task a 
Predator, Global Hawk, or U-2.  There are two guiding tenets in developing this concept.  
First, the equipment and its control should be organic to the SOF unit or task force.  
Second, utilizing this capability should not require the soldier to carry any additional 
equipment into the field.   
Initial research led us to the idea of using networked unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS’s) to generate an over-the-horizon surveillance capability for SOF.  We 
demonstrated the concept by forming a network comprised of a forward ground team, an 
inexpensive, test-bed UAS equipped with an off-the-shelf video camera, a manned 
aircraft, and a tactical operations center (TOC).  We attained connectivity through an ITT 
Mesh structure at 2.4 GHz, amplified to 1W.  Researchers were from the Defense 
Analysis, Mechanical and Astronautical Engineering, and Information Sciences 
Departments.  We conducted successful experiments through the USSOCOM-NPS 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The NPS Tactical Horizon Extension Project objective is to define and 
demonstrate a concept by which task force-level commanders and below can obtain a 
persistent, over-the-horizon surveillance capability for the purpose of target development 
and other missions without tasking national or theater-level assets.  Our goal is to 
increase the ISR capacity of units who normally would not rate the priority to task a 
Predator, Global Hawk, or U-2.  There are two guiding tenets in developing this concept.  
First, the equipment and its control should be organic to the SOF unit or task force.  
Second, utilizing this capability will not require the soldier to carry any additional 
equipment into the field.   
Initial research led us to the concept of using networked unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS’s) to generate an over-the-horizon surveillance capability for SOF.  We 
demonstrated the concept by forming a network comprised of a forward ground team, an 
inexpensive, test-bed UAS equipped with an off-the-shelf video camera, a manned 
aircraft, and a tactical operations center (TOC).  We attained connectivity through an ITT 
Mesh structure at 2.4 GHz, amplified to 1W.  We found we could launch the UAS from a 
rear area, guide it to a specific target and send video of that target to both forward 
operators and TOC personnel.  One should note here that we chose this particular 
network composition because the NPS researchers were already using mesh cards and 
antennas in their UAS’s.  We do not advocate this exact system for use in the field for 
several reasons including limited range between nodes and current fragility of the mesh 
network.  If SOCOM is interested in exploring this concept, future research will require a 
coherent concept of employment as well as an assessment of technology. 
The Tactical Horizon Extension Project was a joint endeavor between the Defense 
Analysis, Mechanical and Astronautical Engineering, and Information Sciences 
Departments.  We conducted successful experiments through the USSOCOM-NPS 



























A. AN AGE OLD PROBLEM 
On the night of 20 November 1970, Colonel Arthur ‘Bull’ Simons made the 
command decision to launch the now legendary Son Tay raid in an attempt to rescue 
between 50 and 100 US Prisoners of War (POW’s) from an isolated camp 28 miles west 
of Hanoi.  In executing Operation Kingpin, Colonel Simons sent over 200 men and 116 
aircraft into harm’s way.  He was acting on hazy, 3-day-old intelligence received at the 
last minute.  In the course of this brilliantly executed raid, the assault force made an 
important discovery.  The North Vietnamese had moved the entire group of POW’s from 
Son Tay to Hanoi long before the raid.1  Clearly, timely intelligence is critical to the 
target development phase of special operations missions.  Of course this is well-known.  
 History is replete with examples of military forces armed with incomplete and/or 
inaccurate intelligence, which caused them to act when they shouldn’t have and not act 
when they should have.  Examples of this abound, from Troy (cool horse) to Agincourt 
(what longbows?) to Normandy (hold the panzers).  The quest for timely, accurate 
intelligence has occupied the minds of commanders since the advent of organized 
military activity.  This has not changed in the 35 years since the Son Tay raid.   
Today a significant portion of our Global War on Terror (GWOT) is an overt 
military campaign involving more than 150,000 men in arms and daily action against 
multiple, loosely-organized, unconventional enemy groups utilizing guerrilla tactics to 
control native populations, attrite our forces, and erode our will to fight.  The principal 
areas of operation in the current phase of this war are Afghanistan and Iraq.  Military 
commanders in these theaters are charged with monitoring just over one million square 
kilometers of diverse terrain for all manner of enemy activity.  Due to the unconventional 
nature of the enemy and our emphasis on hard or ‘kinetic’ solutions, our current strategy 
for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in this war focuses upon finding and targeting these 
irregular groups and, occasionally, a single member or leader of a group.2   
                                                 
1 Lieutenant General Leroy J. Manor’s description of the Son Tay raid, retrieved from 
http://www.vietnamwar.com/sontayprisonraid.htm. 
2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism,” 
2 
B. CURRENT ASSETS AND TACTICS 
To gain the information required to prosecute such missions, we have fielded 
numerous Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mechanisms to monitor 
various geographic areas for all types and levels of enemy activity.  As the global 
superpower with a historic penchant for technology-based weaponry, our array or ISR 
equipment is impressive.  At the strategic (national) level, we employ a robust 
constellation of satellites to monitor portions of the Earth in several mediums, including 
radar, infra-red (IR), and electro-optical (EO).  At the theater level, we employ “multi-
int” systems such as the Lockheed U-2 and Northrop QR-4 Global Hawk to gather both 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT).  Also at the theater 
level, unmanned airborne platforms, such as the General Atomics RQ-1 Predator, gather 
IMINT to protect friendly positions and attempt to expose enemy ones.  With a 
substantial loiter time and a full motion video (FMV) capability; the Predator has become 
the SOF commander’s platform of choice to support tactical operations, particularly 
direct action.3  Below the task force level, several types of Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS’s) are now available to gather tactical IMINT to support all manner of military 
operations from convoy protection to perimeter defense to manhunting.  There is also a 
new generation of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV’s) in production to support 
perimeter defense as well as urban reconnaissance in advance of flesh-and-blood soldiers.  
Rounding out this array of ISR technologies is a collection of Remote Sensors (RS’s) 
which can be placed or airdropped on the ground in a given area for the purpose of 
passively detecting enemy activity.  Small, inexpensive, lightweight, and easily 
disguised, such sensors offer a rugged, dispersed, and persistent detection capability.  But 
because these sensors must be retrieved or at least overflown in order to reap the 
information they have collected, they lack the real-time or even near-real-time 
intelligence that the modern command echelon craves.4   
                                                 
(2006):  22-29, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/docs/2005-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf , September, 2006. 
3 This information was gained through several interviews with operations personnel from various 
components of SOCOM in March of 2006. 
4 This information was gained through an afternoon of conversations with acquisitions and 
programming personnel at SOCOM in March of 2006. 
3 
At the tactical level of operations, FMV is king.  It is the most desired medium 
through which decision makers can develop and assess a target or situation for action.  
FMV is real-time and requires little or no interpretation by a trained imagery analyst.  It 
is essentially television.  Virtually every asset which can provide FMV or even near-real-
time imagery over the horizon or Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS) falls into the category of 
Low Density High Demand (LD/HD) systems.  In other words, the demand for the ISR 
products of these assets (U-2, Global Hawk, Predator, etc.) outweighs the limited 
capacity of the relatively low number of these very expensive platforms.5  Thus far, the 
special operations community’s answer for this has been to simply claim more assets.6  
But even with the Department of Defense’s added emphasis on special operations, a gap 
exists between what is needed by special operations personnel to develop potential 
targets, and what is available to them.7  We conceived the Naval Postgraduate School 
Tactical Horizon Extension Program in an effort to close this gap. 
C. A NEW CONCEPT 
We propose in this paper to introduce a concept by which a SOF task force or 
smaller organization can utilize existing, low-cost technologies with Line-of-Sight (LOS) 
links to obtain a BLOS surveillance capability for the purpose of developing potential 
targets or objectives, without tasking theater-level or above assets.  In short, we will 
demonstrate that tactical ground forces can establish a network comprised of one or more 
UAS’s as well as manned aircraft and other ground teams to help fill this shortfall in ISR 
capability.  Furthermore, this concept combined with emerging UAS platforms will 
enable the small, forward maneuver team to utilize UAS ISR output, including direct 
access to raw FMV, without physically carrying the system on their backs or exposing 
themselves in the target area.  Finally, this capability can be organic to the task force or 
lower headquarters, thereby increasing that unit’s autonomy in launching and tasking its 
own aircraft, as well as exploiting the resultant IMINT or SIGINT. 
                                                 
5 Don Snyder, et al. Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary Forces:  Capabilities and Sustainability 
of Air and Space Expeditionary Forces (Santa Monica:  Rand, 2006), 3.   
6 This information was gained through several interviews with operations personnel from various 
components of SOCOM in November of 2005. 
7 Taken from non-attribution comments of a SOCOM component operator upon his return from 
Afghanistan, April 2006. 
4 
In proving this concept, we will first explain its origins and how our initial 
research pointed to a need for increasing the ISR capacity of smaller SOF units.  Then we 
will develop a scenario in which this BLOS surveillance capability could aid SOF forces 
in finding and fixing a given target.  We will test this scenario in the field as part of the 
USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field Experimentation Program utilizing existing NPS 
assets and on-going UAS research.  Finally, we will present the results of these tests with 
findings, feedback from USSOCOM, and recommendations for further research. 
D. A FEW WORDS ON CLASSIFICATION 
This paper is unclassified despite the fact that initial research pointed to several 
classified applications of the concept.  Upon immersing ourselves in the USSOCOM-
NPS Cooperative Field Experimentation Program, we found that our program overlapped 
other existing research efforts and that several principal players on the technical side of 
these programs were foreign nationals and unable to obtain security clearances.  These 
engineers proved absolutely essential to the technical development of this concept, 
namely networking UAS’s.  Without their outstanding ability, persistence, and technical 
innovation we would not have been able to conduct successful field experiments.  It is for 
the above reasons that all of the work contained within remains unclassified. 
5 
II. NETWORKS AND CONTOL 
A. CHOOSING AN ARCHITECTURE  
The appeal of using certain technologies, besides immediate availability, was the 
ability to simulate a capability that could be translated from limited test capabilities to a 
robust military application with minimal R&D and/or cost.  The ITT Mesh network was 
one of those technologies which held significant promise for demonstrating the Tactical 
Horizon Extension concept by tying together ground and air UAS control nodes by 
means of a self-forming/self-healing network.  Mesh was already in use by NPS for other 
applications, so it was known and available.  The real appeal was highlighted when 
Eugene Bourakov8 explained the only equipment required to join the network was a 
laptop computer with a PCM CIA mesh network card, connected to a small 2.4GHz omni 
antenna (smaller devices, such as PDAs, could and have been used but were unavailable 
for our use).9  The significance of the small equipment footprint cannot be overstated.  
Aircraft and soldiers in the field are being overburdened with every new piece of 
technology that comes along (some with little value)—increasing weight, power 
requirements and decreased mobility.  Our vision is that Tactical Horizon Extension 
capability can be added to any aircraft or ground team with few if any of the 
aforementioned penalties.10  The control mechanism would be Situational Awareness 
(SA) software developed by Eugene Bourakov that works through the mesh network and 
video is viewed via Pelco-Net software. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF MESH 
Since the systems used to demonstrate the Tactical Horizon Extension concept are 
not intended for fielding; working knowledge vs. engineering knowledge of the 
equipment should be more than adequate to support ours and follow-on research. 
 
                                                 
8 Eugene Bourakov is a Research Associate in the Information Sciences Department at NPS. 
9 Initial discussion in Mar 06 with Eugene Bourakov, Dr. Dave Netzer, Dr. Kevin Jones and Dr. 
Vladimir Dobrokhodov regarding potential architecture solutions. 
10 Other combinations of control and data transfer were discussed (i.e. mesh control, 802.16 video 
link), but multiple systems drastically increased the logistical footprint and fell from consideration. 
6 
1. The ITT Mesh Description11 
“Mesh” as we refer to it is commercial-off-the-shelf-technology (COTS) using 
2.4GHz wireless network cards with an internal amplification of 200mW.  Data transfer 
rates of 6MBps are possible when using data-burst modes, but 1MBps is realistic for 
streaming data/video data transfer applications with multiple nodes.  Unlike a hub and 
spoke network where users must go through the hub or server to access data, the mesh 
allows for any user to pull data from any other user as long as there is a path of 
connectivity (data may take several “hops” along other connected systems before 
reaching the requestor’s terminal).  As new members join or members leave the network, 
the paths will change to include the new addition or re-route to fill in for the lost one. 
2. Limitations of Mesh 
The advantages of a self-forming, self-healing network create one of the most 
significant limitations as well.  Since there is no server, each client on the network pulls 
data through a separate conduit, meaning the overall bandwidth is not shared by each 
user; it is divided by each user.  Even when two users are requesting the same data from 
any source, separate data streams are created instead of shared, effectively cutting the 
band width in half.  Added strain on the data pipeline is created by network “polling” or 
“handshaking” between nodes, especially with dozens of active clients, hence this mesh 
characteristic can overwhelm the system with the “overhead” of making the computers 
talk.  With only 1MB/sec available and FMV users and equipment demanding anywhere 
from 100KB/sec to 10MB/sec, bandwidth management and user access become critical to 
prevent crippling network data flow.  It should be noted, UAS control signals are also 
sharing the same pipeline but the data transfer requirements are small enough to be 
considered negligible.  
Another limitation that needed resolution before deciding on mesh as our 
architecture for demonstration purposes was power (wattage) and corresponding 
range/distance between clients.  At 200mW, the mesh card proved capable of networking 
within 1 or 2 kilometers, but our demonstration concept would need to double or 
quadruple that distance.  Commercial 2.4GHz/1W (FCC limit) amplifiers were purchased 
                                                 
11 Mesh information accessed from http://www.motorola.com/governmentandenterprise/ 
contentdir/en_US/Files/General/data_sheet_mea.pdf (5 Sep 2006). 
7 
for the manned aircraft (called the Pelican), Ground Control Station, Ground Team and 
Rascal UAS, to increase range but exactly how far was an unknown that created our first 
field test requirement.  Closely coupled to the range issue was what type of antenna 
would provide the greatest range while still providing the most reliable coverage pattern 
for use on aircraft and moving vehicles.  Range capability became one of the most 
difficult pre-requisites to nail down prior to the Tactical Horizon Extension 
demonstration. 
The last limitation (for our purposes), and one which is the most difficult to 
control or change—is the operational frequency—2.4MHz.  The number of commercial 
systems that use this frequency band is enormous; everything from cordless phones to 
wireless routers clog the airways and can potentially disrupt the mesh with subtle or 
potentially catastrophic results.  Mesh was found to be very fragile in this regard, thus 
creating an almost sterile 2.4MHz environment was important to the success of the 
Tactical Horizon Extension experiment (ITT has the same mesh capability in systems 
using frequencies other than 2.4MHz, which may reduce these problems in future tests).12  
The initial test concepts can be found in Appendix 1. 
C. NPS RASCAL UAS AIRCRAFT AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
The Rascal UAS is a highly modified SIG Rascal 110 remote control airplane.  
The plane is designed for docile /forgiving handling characteristics and its fuselage leaves 
ample room for additional equipment (Figures 1 & 2).  In the NPS configuration, the 
aircraft is launched manually with a standard RC type controller tied into the Piccolo 
autopilot (with an amplified antenna for added range, Figure 3).  Control is passed from 
the manual Piccolo control (via the RC controller) to the computer control (Figure 4), 
where control inputs and telemetry are passed via 900MHz link. 
                                                 
12 The problems identified with mesh are areas of research to be pursued if the Horizon Extension 
project were to be pursued for potential military applications. 
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NPS Rascal UAS  
Physical Description
2dBi/2.4GHz Omni Antenna for  
SA Control and Video
GPS Antenna
900MHz Manual/Direct Piccolo 
Control and Telemetry
Sony Camera and 
Gimbal
 
Figure 1.  NPS Rascal UAS Physical Description 
 
Rascal Avionics Bay
Nose             Tail
Piccolo Auto Pilot
Pelco Video Card





Figure 2.  NPS UAS Avionics Bay 
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Manual Launch/ Recovery 
of NPS Rascal UAS
  
Figure 3.  Manual Launch and Recovery of UAS 
 
NPS Ground Control Van
Ground Control 
Station Computer
Piccolo Control and 
Telemetry Station 
 
Figure 4.  NPS Control Van Set-Up 
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The UAS can then be controlled via SA through the mesh 2.4GHz network 
ground control station13, whereas the video gimbal can be controlled and images passed 
back through the same architecture.  The SA ground control station can also monitor 
what commands are input to the SA system and on to the Piccolo autopilot.  Figures 5 
and 6 shown the visual presentations and control aspects of the SA and Pelco Net 
software that were used by the GCS, Pelican and ground team.  Since Tactical Horizon 
Extension is not advocating these software programs for potential fielding, general 
knowledge of their function is all that is required to further our discussion. 
Computer/UAS Interface and Controls 
Waypoint 
Designator














Figure 5.  SA Computer/UAS Interface and Controls 
                                                 
13 In our set-up, the SA ground control station does not refer to a large package of significant 
capability or size.  It is simply a similarly configured laptop as the Pelican and ground team but is co-
located with the Piccolo ground control station. 
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Computer/UAS Interface and Controls II
Pan/Tilt 
Control
UAV Orbit Radius 
(Meters)
Ground/Objective 
Altitude (Meters) Camera 
Zoom
Camera Locks 









Figure 6.  SA Computer/UAS Interface and Controls    
  
1. Mesh Range and Antenna Configurations 
The Tactical Horizon Extension demonstration was to be conducted at Camp 
Roberts Army National Guard Post (10 miles north of Paso Robles, CA) as part of the 
quarterly USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field Experiment Program.  So, to replicate 
demonstration conditions, initial range and antenna tests were attempted at Camp Roberts 
by dovetailing off of other tests, which required the use of the NPS Rascal UAS.  
Connectivity would be evaluated by subjective evaluation of Rascal video quality and by 
“pinging” mesh and video IPs to evaluate packet delivery and response loss and times.  A 
Ground Control Van Accident, engine trouble, winds, computer problems and experiment 
priority left literally no data collected prior to TNT 06-3 in June.  Major Glass spent two 
days trying to establish network connections with Rascal, both on the ground and in the 
air, using different antennas at different distances (from ½ to 2 ½ km) with no or 
poor/unusable video quality.  Major Landreth spent the following two days repeating the 
tests using the set-up shown in Figure 7.  Connectivity was established with Rascal on the 
ground/air (in an orbit around the runway) and good video (at 500KB/sec) was 
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maintained at 2km using a 7dBi omni antenna and 13dBi patch directional antenna, but 
time constraints limited any further evaluation of other antennas at other distances. 
Antenna/Distance and  
Network Performance 
Evaluation--June 2006







Figure 7.  Antenna/Distance Performance Evaluation Set-Up 
 
D. AIRBORNE UAS CONTROL/DISTANCE EVALUATION 
 The 27th of July presented another opportunity to gather data and attempt to 
transfer control of the UAS while the aircraft was in an orbit around the McMillan 
Airfield at Camp Roberts (set-up depicted in Figures 8 & 9).   
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UAS Control Ground Rehearsals 








Figure 8.  UAS Ground Control Rehearsal 
 
UAS Control Ground Rehearsals 
and Antenna/Distance Evaluation       
27 July 2006
Tracking Patch 13dBi 
High Gain Antenna
 
Figure 9.  UAS Ground Rehearsal Antenna Set-Up 
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While conducting pre-flight conductivity checks with Rascal, we were unable to get a 
satisfactory video picture on the ground, and as the day wore on winds picked up and we 
were unable to fly.  Initial assessment of the problem indicated a possible overheating 
problem with the Pelco video card, for which, we had no spare (ambient temperature was 
in excess of 105 deg. F.).  So the day of practice and data collection turned into a 
scouting expedition for a demonstration target location and observation post (OP) for the 
ground team.  Target selection was based on easily identifiable dirt road intersections in 
the floor of a shallow valley that would ensure the Rascal UAS would remain BLOS of 
the ground control station as it orbited the target and the OP was not in visual contact 
with the target and BLOS with the GCS (detailed description to follow in the 
demonstration sections).   
 After multiple attempts over several weeks to collect the required data with only a 
few data points collected, the decision was made to test the ability of a manned airborne 
platform (Pelican with Major Glass) to control a static Rascal UAS at Marina airfield just 
north of Monterey (home airport of the Pelican).  To this point, few tests had been 
dedicated to the range/connectivity issue and jumping to an airborne test might seem bold 
when evaluating a new concept.  But enough was known, based on previous NPS 
experience, and the time constraints were significant enough to make this a reasonable 
and necessary step forward.  The goals were to evaluate network conductivity and video 
quality using 2dBi omni antennas on both the Pelican and Rascal as pictured in Figures 
10, 11, 12 & 13.  
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First Flight Test 
with Pelican and 
















Figure 10.  First Flight Test Set-Up—Rascal Pedestal 
 
First Flight Test 
with Pelican and 






























Figure 13.  Pelican Computer Operator Station 
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The test was highly successful, exceeding any of the participants’ expectations.  
Connectivity, camera control and high quality video were maintained beyond three miles 
and at altitudes up to 2,000ft.  The Pelco video card problems seemed to have resolved 
themselves as the Pelican station did not experience any of the problems previously 
encountered at Camp Roberts.  Again, this led us to suspect possible overheating 
problems as the cause of the video issues because everything worked as advertised and 
the temperature was a cool 58 deg. F.  A complete summary can be found in Appendix 
2.14  We were unable to test different antenna configurations; however, based on the 
scenario devised for Camp Roberts, the network performance recorded at the Marina 
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III. TACTICAL HORIZON EXTENSION 
A. TACTICAL HORIZON EXTENSION BUILD-UP 
The successful test at Marina and a shortage of time forced us into using the data 
collected on distances and video quality at Marina as the baseline for our entire 
experiment at Camp Roberts on 15 &17 Aug (the focal experiment for TNT 06-4).  In 
building the schedule however, three practice sessions were built into the week in order 
to practice transfer of control of NPS Rascal prior to the demonstrations.  It should be 
noted that since no other antenna configuration had been successfully tested, the Pelican 
and Rascal would use 2dBi omni antennas and the ground team would use a 3dBi antenna 
which would provide the most conservative antenna selection at the expense of gained 
distance.15  The original Tactical Horizon Extension demonstration test synopsis is 
included as Appendix 3, and the final synopsis/diagram (below) and timeline, as 
distributed to SOCOM and all other TNT-06-4 participants, is included in Appendix 4.  
1.   Tactical Horizon Extension Overview and Visual Representation (as 
published for TNT 06-4—Graphic Shown in Figure 14) 
“SOLIC Thesis students Major John Glass and Major Kent Landreth have joined 
with the NPS SUAV Research Team and the NPS CENETIX to demonstrate the transfer 
of UAS/UAV control between a ground control station (GCS/control van), a manned 
fixed wing aircraft (CIRPAS Pelican) and a forward deployed ground team, to create 
target development capability using tactical ISR assets.  The intent is to use a wireless 
ITT Mesh network (2.4GHz) amplified to 1W in order to control the UAS and view 
streaming video.  The Pelican will have an operator (Major Glass), laptop configured 
with mesh card and 1 W amplifier connected to an externally mounted 2 dBi antenna.  
The forward deployed ground team will have a similarly configured laptop with a 
portable 3 dBi antenna.  The UAS will be launched manually and control passed to the 
GCS, who will then assume aircraft/payload (camera) control via the NPS developed 
Situational Awareness software and server.  The Pelican will assume UAS control via SA 
and recon the objective area—simulating BLOS from the GCS—and then send the UAS 
to a pre-planned waypoint, where the ground team will assume control through the SA 
                                                 
15 The tests at Marina gave sufficient range to meet the distances previously established between 
ground control station and Target at Camp Roberts. 
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server and return the UAS to the objective area for further target development.  The TOC 
will monitor video and provide scenario updates based on information gathered through 
mesh video feeds.  UAS control will then be returned to the Pelican and GCS respectively 
for a manual landing at the airfield.”16  
 
Figure 14.  Tactical Horizon Extension Demonstration Orientation 
 
B.   TNT 06-4, CAMP ROBERTS, CA—11-18 AUGUST 2006 
 Tactical Horizon Extension demonstration dates were the 15th and 17th of August, 
but preparations began on Aug 11th, as we built the target and prepared for at least three 
test flights prior to the first demonstration on the 15th.  Target design was meant to 
provide the maximum contrast with the surrounding terrain, and to give the best chances 
of finding and maintaining the target within the camera field of view (Figure 15).  It is 
important to note that we would not anticipate “searching” for a target; instead we 
envisioned a ground team knowing with a good deal of precision where the target is 
located and then using the UAS to develop it, not find it.  Further, we had yet to 
successfully control both the UAS and camera via our computers so we wanted to make 
our objectives reasonable for the first time out.   
 
                                                 
16 Taken from USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field Experiment TNT 06-4 Experiment description, 

















Top of Target Painted with Alternating 
2ft. Black and White Stripes
Ground Control Station/ 
Runway 2.7mi.
 
Figure 15.  Target Construction 
 
1. Equipment Set-Up and Testing 
 Once the target had been constructed on Fri, 11 Aug., Saturday 12 Aug. was 
meant for ground testing the aircraft, antennas, and computers to ensure we were ready to 
tackle the test flights on Sunday, 13 and Monday, 14 August.  Using the configuration 
seen in Figure 16, each system was tested for network connectivity and video 
presentation using Rascal 293 (on the ground only).  The Pelican aircraft was not 
scheduled to arrive until Monday morning, so all tests of the airborne computer were 
conducted with a similar setup to the one used by the ground team.  Right away problems 
were noted with the video presentation, and most of the rest of the day was spent 












Figure 16.  Initial Connectivity Test Set-Up 
 Not all was going well in other parts of the experiment:  Rascal 281, the back-up 
aircraft for the Tactical Horizon Extension flights, damaged its landing gear on take-off 
in strong cross-winds and upon landing the gear completely collapsed, slightly damaging 
the fuselage.  At least 24 hours would be needed to repair the undercarriage.  Following 
this incident Dr. Dave Netzer (Thesis Advisor) made the wise decision to delay any test 
flights prior to the demonstration in order to focus on correcting the video transmission 
problems and save the primary aircraft for the demonstrations on Tuesday and Thursday 
of the following week.   
 Working towards fixing the video transmission problem, Dr. Kevin Jones 
replaced the Pelco card on board the Rascal with no change in the video output.  Further 
discussion led us to consider some sort of unintentional electronic interference--due to the 
high amount of RF energy in and around the airfield.17  It was decided on Sunday to take 
Rascal 293 out to the target and evaluate our connectivity with the UAS perched on top 
of the target structure (similar to the Marina set-up).  Results were good with the Pelican 
and Ground Station computers, but the ground team was still limited to poor video 
                                                 
17 Dr. Netzer had a thorough frequency de-confliction plan but it was hard to monitor all sources of 
RF energy. 
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quality.  In dialogue with Eugene Bourakov, it was decided to replace the ground team 
computer with an identically configured one.  The results were immediate and 
improvement substantial . . . good quality video could be maintained by each of the 
computer systems while controlling the camera on board Rascal 293.  Sunday came to an 
end with fully functional components and the plan would be to test them in their 
respective Tactical Horizon Extension configurations on Monday.18 
 Early morning fog delayed the arrival of the Pelican, but the time was used to 
verify the solid video pictures of the previous evening, and results were once again 
positive.  After Pelican arrival, the afternoon was spent testing the connectivity of the 
Pelican computer after installation into the aircraft, the results of which were as good as 
they had been previously in Marina.  We made the decision to fly a conservative profile 
in and around the airfield as part of Tactical Horizon Extension 1—the detailed timeline 
(Appendix 4) would be sacrificed in order to focus on the major muscle movements of 
transferring control and manipulating the camera through our respective SA systems.  
The objective area became a resolution target painted on the departure end of Runway 28: 
the Pelican would be in an orbit overhead the airfield, and the ground team would take up 
a position at the approach end of Runway 28.  We and our equipment were ready…so we 
thought.  
C. TACTICAL HORIZON EXTENSION 1, TUESDAY 15 AUGUST 2006 
 As with the previous mornings, the fog was thick and delayed flying activities for 
about 2 ½ hours.  Once again the time was used to check and recheck all of the systems 
and configurations (Figure 17).  One change from the night before was to launch the UAS 
for a short flight and then recover it to assess all of its components as it had not flown in 
several weeks.  Keeping with the sequence of events (not the timeline), the Pelican 
launched uneventfully at 1037L and began its climb to its orbit altitude of 3500 MSL.  
The ground team vehicle was established at the approach end of Runway 28 and kept 
radio contact with the Pelican (Figure 18).19  The GCS van spent the next 30 minutes 
establishing itself next to the runway (it had to be moved 200ft from the runway for 
                                                 
18 Rascal 281 would be repaired by Monday as a back-up for the scheduled test flights, but Dr. 
Vladimir Dobrokhodov was called away unexpectedly, leading to the cancellation of Mondays test flights. 
19 Even though everyone was within line of sight radio range, to exercise the communications links 
that would be required on Thursday, it was decided to keep the communication plan the same. 
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Pelican take-offs and landings) and preparing Rascal 293 for takeoff.  Rascal departed for 
its short “warm-up” flight and landed uneventfully seven minutes later.  Airframe and 
payload inspection yielded no concerns so the aircraft was immediately re-launched at 
which point it climbed under manual control and was passed off to the Piccolo controller.  
An orbit was established over the airfield by Rascal at 1,000ft AGL and in Figure 19 the 
two aircraft can been seen in what appears to be close formation, but are actually 
separated by 1500ft. 
Tactical Horizon Extension 1—Pelican 
15 Aug 2006
 
Figure 17.  Tactical Horizon Extension 1—Pelican 
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Tactical Horizon Extension 1—Ground Team 
15 Aug 2006
 
Figure 18.  Tactical Horizon Extension 1—Ground Team 
 
Tactical Horizon Extension 1 
15 Aug 2006
Pelican              
2500ft AGL
Rascal 293           
1000ft AGL
 
Figure 19.   Rascal and Pelican in Flight 
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1. Transfer of Rascal Control to Pelican 
Positive control of the aircraft was transferred to the Pelican from the GCS (a first 
according to our research of network control in a manned aircraft—others have 
demonstrated full GCS control from manned aircraft) where Major Glass input a 
waypoint approximately 2.5km north of the airfield with the intent of reducing the time 
compression of having everything happening right on top of the airfield.  He would then 
turn the Rascal around and bring it back to the resolution target.  Rascal acted as expected 
and was visually seen turning toward the north and tracking straight and level until it 
could no longer be seen.  Shortly thereafter the ground team received a call from Pelican 
that they had lost their video signal, at which point all stations confirmed the loss of 
video input.  Not coincidentally, the GCS, Pelican and ground team were no longer 
receiving GPS position updates and Rascal 293 no longer was shown as a node in the 
mesh architecture or was broadcasting telemetry over the 900MHz link.  Periodically a 
network link would be re-established with the aircraft but it would be lost before any 
commands could be given for the aircraft to return to the airfield.  Dr. Dave Netzer, Dr. 
Kevin Jones (with a transponder DF antenna) and the ground team departed for the 
coordinates of the last GPS telemetry coordinates sent by the Piccolo autopilot.  The 
remainder of the crew at the airfield continued to get sporadic connectivity with the UAS 
but connections were lost as quickly as they were acquired. 
A hand-held GPS, the transponder antenna, and a good pair of binoculars located 
a relatively intact aircraft on the ground approximately 200 meters from the last waypoint 
entered from Pelican (Figures 20 & 21). 
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First Fight Crash Rascal 293  
(Engine Failure) 15 Aug 2006
Impact Point approx.    
2.7km from Runway  
Figure 20.  First Flight Crash 
 
Rascal 293 Engine/ 
Airframe Damage




No Rotational Damage 
to Propeller—Indicative 
of Engine Failure  
Figure 21.  Rascal Damage—Post Crash 
Inspection of the area around the aircraft revealed the landing gear approximately 
50 meters uphill in a clearing with ground furrows leading to its resting location at the 
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base of a tree.  The aircraft itself showed almost no damage to the wings and fuselage, 
but the engine/mount and firewall had separated from the cockpit.  In fact, the 
autopilot/GPS and mesh networking payloads were still on and appeared to be 
operational.  The propeller was still intact and showed no signs of rotational damage—
indicating it was most likely not turning when the aircraft impacted the ground. 
2. Post Crash Analysis 
Engine failure was confirmed by analyzing the telemetry data sent back to the 
Piccolo control station through the 900MHz link.  For unknown reason or reasons, the 
engine quit 1 min. 53 sec. after the Pelican took control and sent it northward towards the 
waypoint.  The autopilot continued to track to the waypoint sacrificing altitude for 
airspeed and had entered its first orbit when it literally landed on the top of a hill and slid 
to a stop.  Figure 22 graphically depicts the events as described above as extracted from 
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Figure 22.  Accident Telemetry 
Discussion of the day’s events highlighted three critical items.  First, we had 
successfully transferred control of the Rascal UAS to the Pelican.  Second, the unique 
self-forming, self-healing nature of the mesh was proven under the most unique of 
circumstances.  The reason for the intermittent network connectivity even after the 
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aircraft had crashed was relatively simple:  the Rascal network payload remained 
operational, and every time the Pelican would get within line-of-sight of the UAS, the 
network connection was re-established, and the GCS and ground party were able to 
connect to the Rascal through the Pelican.  As the Pelican orbit took them BLOS, 
connectivity was lost until the next orbit.  The third item was the need to screen capture 
each of the computer stations activity for better post-mission analysis. 
3.   Tactical Horizon Extension 2 Preparation  
Fortunately, Rascal 281 had been repaired and fell in to the primary slot for our 
final opportunity to demonstrate the Tactical Horizon Extension concept.  Wednesday, 16 
Aug was intentionally programmed as a day for correcting any issues that arose during 
the first demonstration and in this case, the task of the day was to prepare our spare UAS 
for Thursday’s demonstration.  Racal 281 did not have the same electronic payload as 
Rascal 293, so the decision was made to swap the entire networking, processing, and 
video stack from 293 to 281.  Due to the earlier crash, once the swap was complete, we 
ran through a complete set of connectivity checks with each system to ensure system 
integrity had not been lost in the crash impact or swap between aircraft.  Following some 
software configuration changes, Rascal, Pelican, GCS and ground team stations were 
operational.   
D. TACTICAL HORIZON EXTENSION 2, THURSDAY, 17 AUGUST 2006 
 Thursday morning again brought fog, but a slight delay was welcome to check-
our equipment one final time.  We decided not to follow our original timeline and 
scenario; we would instead exercise all of the major parts of the scenario when and if we 
became comfortable in our ability to effectively control the Rascal and its 
payload/camera.  We had no doubt in the capability to accomplish the task at hand; our 
concern lay in what other unknown might be out there which could affect the results. 
 Shortly after 0900, the Pelican took-off and established its orbit at 2,500ft. AGL 
above the runway.  In the interim, the ground team moved out to the OP, approximately 
1,000m from the target, and established communication and network links with the 
Pelican and GCS (via Pelican) back at the airfield.  Video connectivity appeared excellent 
as all players were able to monitor the preparation of Rascal 281 for take-off through the 
onboard camera.  Rascal was airborne at about 0930 and manually climbed out.  Control 
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was passed to the Piccolo autopilot controller and finally the SA GCS controller 
established a 1,000ft AGL orbit over the airfield.  After a thorough check out of the 
network and autopilot interfaces, the Pelican took control of the aircraft and established 
new waypoints in and around the airfield.  Progress was slow but positive, except for 
control over the camera.  The default mode for the camera is to look at the coordinates of 
the waypoint which is active within the autopilot.  It was unclear what geo-spatial point 
the camera was looking at, but the decision was made to press on with the profile and 
troubleshoot the problem in flight.   
 Pelican was finally given clearance to take Rascal 281 all the way to the target 
area in an attempt to find and orbit the painted 8x8ft. structure.  Unfortunately, the 
camera problems continued, and few if any recognizable features could be seen on the 
video.  The ground team could visually see the UAS in an orbit that approximated the 
area around the target, but also could not correlate what was being seen on the video.  
Manual control of the camera was attempted, but with no known visible ground 
references, the target could not be found.  After 15 minutes in the target area, UAS 
control was passed to the ground team who spent another 10 fruitless minutes trying to 
locate the target by manually manipulating the camera with no success.  Successful 
transfer of control back to the Pelican and on to the GCS for an uneventful landing 
brought to a close Tactical Horizon Extension 2. 
1. Post Mission Analysis 
Overall, the mission was a success in that effective UAS control was passed 
between all players and video images (of what we are unsure) were received through the 
same network.  Dr. Dave Netzer pushed for the team to find a solution to the video 
control problems and re-accomplish the mission in 2 hours.  There is no doubt, that
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completing the profile as originally planned would be a much better story, so the 
technical team20 went to work in order to iron out the video control bugs.  After lengthy 
ground testing, it was discovered that the default altitude for the target in SA was set to 
490 meters by looking at the UAS control message and the SA camera control panel 
(Figure 23).  The result of the default setting is the camera would be looking at a point 
nearly 700feet above the target (almost level with the aircraft).  Thus, the look angle of 
the camera would appear to be out on the horizon.  Once the fix was identified and the 
changes verified through SA (Figure 24), preliminary tests were conducted to re-
accomplish Tactical Horizon Extension 2.     
Situational Awareness Control Board 
Displaying Incorrect Target Altitude
Default Target 
Altitude of 490m Input 
to Camera Gimbal
 
Figure 23.  Incorrect Target Altitude in SA 
                                                 





Changing and Confirming Target 
Altitudes
 
Figure 24.  Correcting Target Altitude 
 
E. TACTICAL HORIZON EXTENSION 2A, AFTERNOON OF 17 AUGUST 
2006 
 Launch of the Pelican and movement of the ground team to the OP were 
uneventful.  Good communications, network and video were established and all players 
were able to watch the launch of Rascal 281 through a live video feed (Figure 25). 
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Rascal 281 Take-Off as Viewed by the 
GCS, Pelican and Ground Team
Ghost Image of Rascal 
293 (Display Anomaly)
Rascal 281 on Take-Off
Pelican in Orbit
 
Figure 25.  Tactical Horizon Extension 2A Take-Off 
Transfer of manual control to Piccolo and on to SA GCS control happened rapidly, and 
the Pelican was cleared to take control and send Rascal 281 to the target area.  The 
Piccolo control station verified the flight of Rascal along Canyon Road enroute to the 
target, and with the change of the target altitude in SA by Pelican, the camera was 
tracking along the same road (Figures 26 &27). 
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Piccolo Telemetry and Control Station 







Figure 26.  Canyon Road from Piccolo 
 
Canyon Road Approach to Target as 









1. Pelican in Control—Finds Target 
 To this point, the network, camera and video were all working well but the true 
test of the system was our ability to find the target.  Positive identification was made of 
the target by Pelican, GCS and the ground team as they viewed the video shown in Figure 
28. Rascal 281 established its orbit as programmed and Pelican began manipulating the 
camera to better define the target and the surrounding area (Figure 29). 




Figure 28.  Pelican Identifies Target 
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Figure 29.  Zooming in on Target  
It is at this point that Pelican had a difficult time manipulating the camera, in an 
attempt to keep the target in view.  A small amount of latency within the camera 
control/video transmission system made fine adjustments difficult, if not impossible.21  
After several more minutes the Pelican sent Rascal 281 to a waypoint near the ground 
team OP where the planned transfer of control took place (Figure 30).  The intentional 
pulling of the Rascal off the target, at this point, might appear to be tempting fate; but it 
was important to the demonstration to show how the ground team could independently 
acquire the target and develop it as though the target had not been previously viewed by 
any other source. 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that the screen captures seen throughout the document were taken at 
significantly reduced image qualities and thus only represent a fraction of the image quality seen during the 
actual demonstration. 
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Pelican Hand-Off to Ground Team
Target
Pelican Initiated Waypoint 
IVO Ground Team
 
Figure 30.  Pelican Transfer of Control to Ground Team 
 
2. Ground Team in Control 
The ground team immediately established a new waypoint in the vicinity of the 
target and visually confirmed the target as seen in Figure 31.  The same images were 
being seen BLOS by the GCS via the mesh, automatically creating a network connection 
to Rascal 281 through the Pelican (Figure 32).  Pelican maintained good quality video 











Figure 31.  Ground Team Control—Orbit of Target 
GCS Real Time View of Ground Team 
Target Capture Through Pelican
Target
 
Figure 32.  GCS Real-Time View of Ground Team Control and Video 
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Pelican Real Time Observation of Ground 
Team Rascal Control and Video of Target
Target
Absence of Waypoint Designator or 
Camera Controls Confirm Pelican is 
Not in Control  
Figure 33.  Pelican Real-Time View of Ground Team Control and Video 
  During the Pelican and Ground Team control of Rascal 281, GCS controllers 
were constantly measuring the distances between Rascal, Pelican, ground team and the 
control van to get a rough idea of how strong mesh connectivity was from air-to-air and 
ground-to-air (Figure 34).  Fortunately, network performance was not an identifiable 
limitation during any part of the demonstration. 
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Evaluating Mesh Distances from GCS
 
Figure 34.  Evaluating Mesh Distances 
 
3. Bringing Rascal Home 
 After collecting sufficient information on the target and surrounding area, the 
ground team established a new waypoint in preparation for hand-off of control back to 
Pelican (Figure 35).  Pelican re-assumed control of Rascal 281 (Figure 36) and sent it 
back to the airfield where manual control was once again used for an uneventful landing 
and demonstration completion.  
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Making a New Waypoint (Preparation for 
Transfer of Control Back to Pelican)
Maintain Target 
SA Drag and Drop Placement 
of New Waypoint
 
Figure 35.  Ground Team—Making a New Waypoint 
Transfer of  Rascal Control from 
Ground Team Back to Pelican
Waypoint 
Designator
No Line Indicates New 
Waypoint Has Not Been 
Established and Pelican is 
Not Yet in Control 
Pelican Will Assume Control 
as Soon as Cursor is 
Released
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IV. RESULTS/FINDINGS 
The results of this experiment exceeded expectations.  In executing our published 
schedule of events, the research team overcame several obstacles to meet every objective 
and gathered useful data on every measure of performance which we established for 
ourselves.  In the paragraphs below we will examine each objective and measure of 
performance in detail. 
A.   OBJECTIVES 
1.   Establish Effective UAS Control via Mesh network (airframe and 
camera) from Airborne and Remote Ground Stations:  Also, add UAS 
waypoints and change flight parameters as well as manipulate on-
board camera for target reconnaissance   
During the first flight on Tuesday, 15 August, we successfully met only part of 
this objective.  The UAS engine failure led to a premature conclusion of the day’s work, 
and while we were unable to thoroughly evaluate the camera or execute a handoff to the 
remote ground party, the airborne node, Pelican, was able to take control of the UAS and 
send it to a new waypoint.  Also, the ensuing search and recovery effort revealed a more 
robust and reliable mesh network than we anticipated.  On the first flight of 17 August, 
we met all but the last sub-objective due to the altitude at which the camera searched for 
its target.  That afternoon we remedied that and successfully met this objective in its 
entirety. 
2.   Evaluate Video Quality to Determine Aircraft and Sensor Capabilities 
As the figures in the previous section show, the camera on the NPS UAS was able 
to find a target with known coordinates.  In manipulating the camera, however, both the 
Pelican operator and forward ground operator experienced difficulty in keeping the target 
in frame with any significant zoom on the camera.  This is due to the small size of the 
UAS in somewhat bumpy atmospheric conditions as well as the camera being hard-
mounted to the fuselage and not gyro-stabilized.  For this reason we determined that, 
while one could find a target area with this camera, one could probably not exploit that 
target with any significant fidelity.  That is to say, we could locate a house but not 
positively identify a particular person entering or leaving that house.  There are several 
reasonably low-cost, small gyro-stabilized cameras available which could eliminate this 
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limitation.  Because the Rascal UAS is simply a test-bed platform used to facilitate a 
wide variety of network and communications experiments, it is not necessary to install 
such a sensor solely for this project.  The current equipment configuration is adequate for 
near-future research in the Tactical Horizon Extension project. 
3. Use the Mesh Network to Supply Real-Time Video to Pelican, Ground 
 Team and TOC for Simulated ISR Target Development  
We met this objective with limited success.  Due to the bandwidth limitations 
discussed earlier, three users attempting to view FMV over this network degrade the 
quality of the video to unusable.  After discovering this, however, we established an 
informal schedule by which only the primary operator at any given time would select 
FMV while the other two would view the imagery in server push mode.  This saved 
enough bandwidth to give the primary operator high quality video (required for 
manipulating the camera) while other nodes received a new frame every few seconds and 
were at least able to see what the primary operator was doing. 
4. Manipulate Mesh Nodes to Simulate BLOS Between Parties 
Central to our research concept is the autonomy of the forward tactical network.  
There were practical concerns in this experiment, however, which limited our ability to 
truly test this.  The primary concern was preserving the UAS.  Because the SA control 
interface does not transmit engine health information or aircraft telemetry, the research 
team was concerned about crashing another UAS (our last one, at the time) by not 
recognizing an impending system or engine failure.  We agreed then that we would 
design the experiment such that the UAS would always be within LOS of the GCS for the 
900MHZ autopilot and, if required, the GCS could intervene, take control of the UAS 
and return it to the airfield.  In order to test the autonomy of the forward tactical network 
then, we simply arranged for the GCS to shut down their mesh node for a short period of 
time.  During this interval the nearly autonomous forward tactical network performed as 
advertised with both the airborne and remote ground nodes able to task the aircraft, 






B.   MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE/ MEASURES OF EVALUATION 
1. Safely Transfer UAS and Camera Control Between GCS, Pelican and 
 Remote Ground Team 
All transfers, or handoffs, between the various nodes were successful and 
uneventful.  Each handoff was, however, verbally coordinated to avoid confusion.  The 
SA software has no priority protocol which would allow a certain node to control the 
aircraft over another node.  Nobody really knew what would happen if two nodes 
simultaneously attempted to control the UAS.  After the mishaps on Saturday and 
Tuesday, the research team unanimously decided that we did not really want to explore 
this aspect of the SA during the present evolution.  We did not, therefore, attempt 
uncoordinated transfers of control.  While this is not important in the context of the Camp 
Roberts experiments, the added burden of voice communications in combat conditions 
could add an unnecessary level of vulnerability to this network concept.  Future research 
should attempt to streamline communications and eliminate the need for network nodes 
to have voice communications. 
2. Evaluate Image Quality for Target Development and UAS/Sensor 
 Control 
As discussed in the Objective section above, the image quality and 
platform/sensor functions were marginal.  Additionally, the sensor control portion of the 
SA program is not as user-friendly as it could be.  The flat display and the in-keyboard 
mouse on the Panasonic Toughbook laptops made camera manipulation somewhat 
difficult.  The addition of a joystick would allow for easier, more intuitive control of the 
camera.  The difficulties in positioning the camera were compounded by latency in the 
video link.  This led to several instances in which the operator attempted to increase the 
camera’s zoom while the target was no longer in the center of the frame, causing him to 
lose the target completely.  The latency issue stems from bandwidth limitations and 
multiple users on the Pelco server.  We currently have no solution for this within the ITT 





3. Functionality of Hardware and Software for Future Development and 
 Field Application 
As stated previously, the UAS, network, and sensor we used in this experiment 
were chosen not for their idyllic properties or direct application in the field.  We used 
these components and software programs because they were available to us and were 
sufficient to test the concept.  For the purpose of future experiments at NPS, the current 
composition of the network and node components are still good enough to further explore 
this concept; for example, adding another UAS to the network.  Field application of this 





V.   CONCLUSIONS 
A. OBSTACLES AHEAD 
The Naval Postgraduate School Tactical Horizon Extension Project is a concept in 
its infancy.  As stated in the introduction, we set out to find a method by which special 
operators could obtain persistent, over-the-horizon ISR capability without tasking LDHD 
assets or requiring an exorbitant budget.  The concept elucidated in this paper offers a 
way for USSOCOM to develop this capability.  But future research must address several 
technical questions before this concept will bear fruit for operators in the field.  The 
primary questions are:  What technology should form the network?  What is the best 
platform for the concept?  And what sensor(s) should that platform carry?   
1. The Network 
As stated earlier, we utilized an amplified ITT Mesh network because the NPS 
Research effort was configured for this format as a consequence of other projects.  The 
ITT Mesh has the advantages of being self-forming and self-healing with full 
connectivity between nodes.  We think these qualities lend the technology to forward, 
dispersed operations.  But this capability comes at the cost of range.  The entire scenario 
described here was executed within 5 kilometers of the UAS departure airfield.  To be 
useful to soldiers in the field, the range between nodes must increase.  Network 
connections utilizing directional 802.16 or 802.20 technology have much better range, 
but cannot provide full connectivity between nodes and inevitably establish at least one 
node as a single point of failure for the entire network. 
Another problem, perennial in mobile networks, is bandwidth.  This is most 
clearly illustrated by the limited FMV output shown in our experiment.  As it stands, each 
node that downloads the Pelco video reduces the network’s available bandwidth 
proportionally.  That is to say, when a second user initiates the Pelco application, the 
bandwidth available to the network is cut in half.  The third user reduces this to one third 
of the original capacity, and so on.  The effect of this is immediately apparent as the 
video fidelity and update rate degrade for all nodes, eventually to uselessness.   
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In addition to the bandwidth issue, the ITT Mesh network is fragile and prone to 
interruption by competing frequency use as well as antenna pointing and masking 
problems.  In our experiment evolution, we mitigated these limitations by artificially 
sterilizing the environment.  As is customary in the TNT experiment process, we 
eliminated frequency competition from other experiments through a rigidly controlled 
emission schedule.  It is of course unreasonable to expect such a level of control in actual 
field conditions.  Recognizing our abbreviated preparatory phase and ensuing aircraft 
mishaps, we found ourselves unable to fully test antennas of varying strength and 
impedance.  We elected to use low-impedance, omni-directional antennas for all nodes.  
These low-cost antennas yielded excellent connectivity throughout all of the flight 
parameters for both the UAS and airborne node, again with a range penalty.  Application 
of this concept in the field must reconcile these technical limitations. 
2. The Platform and Sensor 
The successful employment of this concept depends upon finding an airframe 
with sufficient power, endurance, and payload to provide a remote team with viable FMV 
for an extended period while being launched from a rear area.  There are a few such 
systems in production or development.  This research team favors Boeing’s Scan Eagle 
for several reasons.  First, the aircraft advertises a 15-hour flight time with a 68-knot 
cruising speed.  This would allow commanders in the field a significant level of 
flexibility in choosing areas to deploy the asset as well as targets to develop.  Second, the 
engine is sufficiently powerful to fly above 16,000 feet MSL.22  This provides standoff 
from small arms, a reduced noise signature, and operations in mountainous terrain.  
Third, the aircraft does not require a runway for launch or recovery.  This adds even more 
flexibility in deciding where to deploy the asset. 
The Scan Eagles in use today are equipped with an inertially-stabilized camera or 
Infra-red sensor capable of providing FMV.  The transmission technology is different, but 
could be altered through research efforts including the USSOCOM-NPS Field 
Experimentation Program, which already possesses a Scan Eagle. 
 
                                                 
22 Scan Eagle information accessed from http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Boeing_ScanEagle_ 
UAV_Surpasses_10000_Combat_Flight_Hours.html (27 Aug 2006). 
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B. THE WAY FORWARD:  TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE 
At one of the first planning meetings in preparation for this project, Dr. Alex 
Bordetsky, an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Sciences, said 
something very important with respect to the development of this concept.  When asked 
what sort of network could be established to facilitate the experiment, he answered that 
the correct question is not what can we put into a network—meaning bandwidth, power, 
etc; but what is appropriate for a particular network connection.  In other words, the 
forward tactical network should be comprised of technology and capability 
commensurate with its intended use.  The concept of employment, or doctrine, is 
therefore as important as technology in addressing the issues of connectivity, bandwidth, 
fidelity, and range in realizing this concept. 
If one applies this idea to the whole project, one sees the way forward is a 
combination of these two concepts:  technology and doctrine.  There are technical 
solutions for all of the issues listed above, eventually.  We can potentially increase mesh 
network range by amplifying the signal to five or even ten watts by simply purchasing the 
amplifiers for the next TNT evolution.  We can increase available bandwidth by 
developing a more robust, expensive network and by incorporating on-board video 
processing and utilizing end-state enhancements such as VICE or TIPS.  Someday, we 
may have a tactical UAS capable of flying for 36 hours and providing both IMINT and 
SIGINT.  Eventually, we could provide a long-range reach back capability that would 
allow CONUS-based commanders to view the FMV and decide on a course of action.   
In addition to the technical effort, however, each of these issues has a 
corresponding solution in the doctrine which dictates the application of the concept.  For 
example, if the forward ground team is autonomous and empowered to formulate and act 
upon a course of action against a given target, range issues for the purpose of reach back 
become less problematic.  Similarly, if one can limit the number of people authorized or 
required to view FMV to the forward operator and commander (and not superfluous 
personnel in the TOC), the bandwidth issue becomes less urgent.  Also, through judicious 
selection of deployment locations, commanders can optimize the coverage of a given 
platform.  This could mitigate range and endurance requirements for the UAS.  
Furthermore, in formulating a concept for operations, special operators would take into 
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account the urgency of the fight with the utility of the concept, and therefore weigh the 
value of a given technical capability against the resources required to develop it. 
A coherent concept for employment, in advance of a full-blown, funded research 
and development program would therefore serve two purposes in this case.  First, it 
would eliminate technical research efforts aimed at developing unneeded capability.  
Second, it would balance the need for a stated requirement against the time and money 
needed to fulfill that requirement.  On the whole, then, a solid concept of employment for 
this capability will make any development effort more cost-effective and put the 
capability in the field sooner.   
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Gaining approval for a research and development program and developing a 
concept of operations for this idea are well outside the scope of this paper and the 
expertise of its authors.  But as stated above, this project is in its infancy and there are 
several possibilities for further research that are within the existing NPS research 
program and budget. 
1. Develop Options for ITT Mesh Networks:  Antennas and 
Amplification 
Because of the problems establishing the network and a compressed preparatory 
stage of our experiments, we were unable to fully exploit different possibilities for 
optimizing the range between mesh nodes.  Future researchers should experiment with 
various antenna configurations to quantify an optimal arrangement for all of the nodes in 
the forward tactical network.  Options include, higher-impedance, directional patch 
antennas and medium-impedance, omni-directional antennas. 
NPS should attempt to obtain an FCC waiver for higher output in the 2.4 GHz 
range.  Five or even ten watts could possibly extend the maximum range of the network 
to approximately six and eight nautical miles respectively.  But this may be problematic 
if the network is not stable.  The amplifier then amplifies noise as well as data.  Only 
further experimentation can answer these questions.  
2. Alter the SA Program to Allow a Single Node to Control Multiple 
UAS’s  
We envision a fully integrated network in which a remote ground team could use 
multiple UAS’s to develop a target utilizing both IMINT and SIGINT.  This would allow 
51 
for cross-queuing between the platforms for enhanced exploitation.  Developing a test 
bed capability for controlling multiple NPS UAS’s through the existing SA program will 
enable future researchers to execute much more advanced scenarios to further explore the 
utility and viability of this concept.   
3. Incorporate the Scan Eagle in Future Experiment Scenarios 
NPS researchers should configure the Scan Eagle for mesh-enabled control and 
use that platform for future experiment scenarios.  In accomplishing this, researchers will 
answer several questions concerning the viability of the Tactical Horizon Extension 
Project in the field.  For example, can the SA program be altered to not only control 
different UAS’s, but also different cameras or sensors?  Will the realization of the 
horizon extension concept require some follow-on version of SA, or something 
completely new?  How well will the mesh network adapt to different or dissimilar 
platforms?  Can the range enhancements discussed in the previous section keep pace with 
a UAS that flies above 10,000 feet?  If not, what alternatives to mesh are available?  By 
addressing these questions through the USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field 
Experimentation Program, NPS will do the bulk of the work required to ascertain the 
combat viability of the Tactical Horizon Extension Project.  USSOCOM can then decide 
if the idea merits further development. 
D.        FINAL THOUGHTS 
We emphasize, once again, this is a rough concept.  We began our research with 
the broad aspiration to contribute something to the special operations community that 
could be useful in the field and available in the near future.  After a series of interviews 
with operators, commanders, and acquisitions personnel at SOCOM, AFSOC, and JSOC, 
we conceived the Tactical Horizon Extension Project.  Because of our unfamiliarity with 
technical research and NPS research programs, our progress was sporadic and slow.  
After TNT 06-04, however, we think this concept is sound and deserves further 
development as quickly as the USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field Experimentation 
Program allows.   
There is real potential for this concept to yield an effective means by which 
special operators can significantly increase their ISR capability through a low-cost, 
organic system of networked UAS platforms.  Such a network requires no UAS pilot 
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training for SOF personnel, just familiarity with whatever mechanism eventually controls 
the sensor.  For the most part, the technology exists today and would not add weight to 
the soldier’s rucksack.  If SOCOM has any interest in this concept, the J3 section should 
present it to operators as soon as practical and begin to formulate a concept of 
employment with which to guide further research and development.  We hope future 
research will succeed in making this concept operational and contribute to field 
operations in the near future.   
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APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENT 1 TEST PLAN 
Experiment #1:  Multiple handoffs of a UAV between ground and air control 
elements 
 
Technology. (Marina airfield)  Using the GCS (van) and NPS UAS (power-on) on the 
ground (preferably suspended), transfer control from Manual (simulated Don launching) 
to Piccolo (Vlad in the van) to a third operator (Kent in vehicle) with SA-equipped laptop 
and antenna (ITT amplified mesh).  Monitor UAS for flight control response and sensor 
movement. 
Attempt further handoff to Pelican with SA-equipped laptop and antennae (amplified 
mesh).  Try several antennae from the aircraft if possible and establish basic range limit 
by concentric, expanding orbit around stationary UAV.  Repeat the handoff sequence 
several times to gain confidence and reveal any glitches in the handoff process. 
 
If possible, accomplish this at a model-aircraft approved flight area.  Therefore, if the 
above actions are successful, we can attempt the same handoff scenarios with an airborne 
UAV. 
If confidence in the process allows, Pelican will attempt to ferry the UAV outside the 
control range of the van, then ferry the UAV back to the van or other ground control  
element. 
 
All users must maintain voice comms to minimize confusion and allow for quick 
resumption of control by the van, or Don. 
 
MOP’s: 
1. Continuity and quality of the mesh network in terms of controlling the aircraft and 
streaming video from the aircraft to the other users. 
2. Seamlessness of the handoff process.  Can different users hand the UAV directly 
or should they relinquish control to the internal autopilot and then allow another 




Van     Kevin Jones, Vlad Dobrokhodov 
Manual controller   Don Meeks 
Ground-mobile SA Controller Kent Landreth/ Eugene Bourakov 
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APPENDIX B. 31 JULY, 2006 FLIGHT TEST SUMMARY 
NPS UAS to Pelican Data Link Over Mesh Network 
 
Date: 31 July 2006 
 
Setup:  Airborne test of Pelican control of NPS UAS sensor. 
IT Amplified Mesh (2.4GHz, 1 watt) network at 3 nodes:  Pelican, UAS (Rascal 
2), and Ground Party (LRV).  Single SA server was on the LRV which was 
parked beside a stepladder on which the UAS was mounted.  The Pelican mesh 
antenna was mounted to the aft extension located at station 8. 
 
Took off at 1550 (L) and brought up SA immediately--achieved a solid link.  Pelican 
established 2nm arc at 900-1000ft AGL.  Pelican node showed excellent video quality in 
Video 1 (500 m/s).  Operator was able to manipulate the UAS camera in pan and zoom 
with only a short delay (1-2 seconds).  Climbed to 1200-1400ft AGL and saw no 
degradation.  Accomplished 2 360-degree turns at 45 degrees of bank at 2.0-2.5 nm and 
saw no masking of the antenna as the video feed remained strong. 
 
Expanded arc to 2.5nm at 2000ft AGL and began to see some degradation in Video 1.  
Display would freeze momentarily every 1-3 minutes.  In each case, the live feed re-
established itself after a momentary delay (1-5 seconds).   
At 2.7-3.0nm Video 2 is more reliable with excellent image quality and only occasional 
drop-outs, all of which resolved in a few seconds. 
 
At 3.1-3.4 nm, Video 2 begins to degrade as drop-outs become more frequent (every 1-2 
minutes) and of longer duration (8-10 seconds) 
 
3.7-3.9 nm, the network connection is broken, but was quickly re-established upon 
closing the distance to 3.0nm. 
 
At 2.5 nm with 45deg of bank there was no loss of video display or control. 
 
Should’ve tried:  climbing in the 2.0-2.5 nm arc to establish a useful ceiling (Netzer’s 
suggestion).  Just guessing that with a 3+ nm useful range, at 2nm the useful ceiling 
would exceed 5000ft above the UAS.  Also, should’ve driven a vehicle slowly down the 
taxiway to test operator ability to follow an object with the sensor—I mostly just looked 
at the ground support party to evaluate the video quality. 
 
Conclusions:  It appears that this network would be reliable up to 3-3.4 nm.  This would 
accommodate our scenario design and allow for a concept demonstration.  But both 
ground and air (pelican) nodes need an SA server.  By having only one SA server in the 
network we allow a single point of failure to a network whose only real advantage is self-
forming, self-healing.  Every node that expects to control the UAS should be equipped 
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APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENT 2 TEST PLAN 




The research team will identify/supply a target in the CR complex—probably north of 
McMillan airfield along Canyon Road.  The target may be an existing structure, a vehicle 
placed at an intersection, or some other suitable and expedient object(s). 
 
Major Landreth will “deploy” to the OP IVO the objective and establish text 
communication thru Nacimiento Hill confirming readiness to receive the UAS.  Major 
Glass will launch the Pelican   
 
Prior to UAS launch, conductivity and control tests will be conducted with the Pelican 
NPS UAS, GCU, and ground party.  The ground team will depart the compound and take 
up an observation post (OP) position near the target but without line of sight, i.e. one 
ravine away.  The designated OP for the ground party will provide similar tactical 
advantages as an actual OP, but will keep LOS with Nacimiento Hill for simulated 
SATCOM conductivity with the TOC (OP location will be established along with 
objective location). 
 
Pelican will depart McMillan airfield and establish an orbit overhead, observing airspace 
restrictions.   
 
The launch and recovery team will launch NPS-1 and hand it off to the Pelican.  Pelican 
will ferry the UAV to the ground team and handoff control when requested.  The ground 
team will find the target, fix its coordinates if able, and set up an orbit to allow for 
surveillance and target development.  (If time allows, we could have a target vehicle 
drive down Canyon Rd. (slowly) to evaluate the sensor and platform against a moving 
target). 
 
The ground team will then hand control back to the Pelican to ferry the UAV back to the 
launch and recovery team.  If the target is mobile, the Pelican controller will attempt to 
follow the target as long as time and fuel allow. 
 
The Pelican will hand the UAV back to the launch and recovery team for landing. 
 
All teams recover to TOC for hot wash/debrief. 
 
All users must maintain voice comms (through the TOC for the Pelican) in order to 




1. Continuity of the Mesh network in terms of seamless handoff of the UAV and text 
messaging between users to coordinate those handoffs. 
2. Ability of the network to supply streaming video to ground team and airborne 
team. 
3. Continuity of the air-to-air link.  As the Pelican orbits the UAV during ferry and 
target portion, when will wing-masking affect the ability of the Pelican controller 




Van     Kevin Jones, Vlad Dobrokhodov 
Manual controller   Don 
Ground-mobile SA Controller Kent Landreth/ Eugene Bourakov 
Pelican controller   John Glass 
Target driver (if required)  Marianna Verett 
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APPENDIX D. TACTICAL HORIZON DEMONSTRATION 
Tactical Horizon Extension 
 
Sunday, 13 August, 2006  Practice Flights    1400-1600 
Monday, 14 August, 2006  Practice Flights   0900-1100 & 1400-1600 
Tuesday, 15 August, 2006  Tactical Horizon Extension 1  0800-1000 




 SOLIC Thesis students Major John Glass and Major Kent Landreth have joined 
with the NPS SUAV Research Team and the NPS CENETIX to demonstrate the transfer 
of UAS/UAV control between a ground control station (GCS/control van), a manned 
fixed wing aircraft (CIRPAS Pelican) and a forward deployed ground team, to create 
target development capability using tactical ISR assets.  The intent is to use a wireless 
ITT Mesh network (2.4GHz) amplified to 1W in order to control the UAS and view 
streaming video.  The Pelican will have an operator (Major Glass), laptop configured 
with mesh card and 1 W amplifier connected to an externally mounted 2 dBi antenna.  
The forward deployed ground team will have a similarly configured laptop with a 
portable 3 dBi antenna.  The UAS will be launched manually and control passed to the 
GCS, who will then assume aircraft/payload (camera) control via the NPS developed 
Situational Awareness software and server.  The Pelican will assume UAS control via SA 
and recon the objective area—simulating BLOS from the GCS—and then send the UAS 
to a pre-planned waypoint, where the ground team will assume control through the SA 
server and return the UAS to the objective area for further target development.  The TOC 
will monitor video and provide scenario updates based on information gathered through 
mesh video feeds.  UAS control will then be returned to the Pelican and GCS respectively 




   Info Flow and Spatial Orientation 
Objectives: 
 
1.  Establish effective UAS control via mesh network (airframe and camera) from      
     airborne and remote ground stations: 
 --Add UAS waypoints and change flight parameters 
 --Manipulate on board camera for target recon 
2.  Evaluate video quality to determine aircraft and sensor capabilities. 
3.  Use mesh to supply real-time video to Pelican, Ground Team and TOC for simulated   
     ISR target development.   




1.  Safely transfer UAS and camera control between GCS and Pelican. 
2.  Safely transfer UAS and camera control between Pelican and ground control Team. 
3.  Image quality for target development and UAS/sensor control. 




LCDR Gordo Cross (USSOCOM)   - TOC CO 
Mr. Sam Nickels (AFSOC)    -  Air Boss, Flight Safety 
Dr. Dave Netzer (NPS)    - Experiment Director 
Dr. Kevin Jones (NPS)    - NPS SUAV 
Dr. Vladimir Dobrokhodov (NPS) 
Dr. Isaac Kaminer (NPS) 











Major John Glass , USAF (NPS)   -  Pelican Payload Operator 
Major Kent Landreth, USAF (NPS)   -  Ground Team Operator 
QMC Darren Anderson (NSWC)   -  Stitched Images 




   
The practice flights will begin on the established times but may end earlier or later based 
on the progress of the checks.  The Pelican will be used for ground checks on Monday 
morning but may/may not be used for flights in the afternoon. 
 
Depending on the progress of the test flights, the Tactical Horizon Extension 1 
objectives and timeline may be changed to replicate the Tactical Horizon Extension 2 
objectives and timeline.  Decision to be made by 1700, Monday 14 August. 
 
Sunday 13 August, 2006:  Practice Flight 1 
 
1300 - GCS/Control Van, Pelican Laptop, Ground Team Laptop and NPS UAS 
set-up, connectivity and control checks 
1400  - NPS UAS Take-Off 
1410  - GCS assumes control (using SA) of UAS and establishes orbit over 
 runway 
1430  - John Glass (co-located at van), using Pelican laptop assumes control       
(using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of resolution target to UAS and 
establishes orbit—practices target reconnaissance 
1450  - Kent Landreth (co-located at van), using Ground Team laptop assumes 
 control (using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of west end of RWY 28 to 
 UAS and establishes orbit—practices target reconnaissance 
1510  - GCS assumes control (using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of GCS to 
 UAS and establishes orbit 
1520-1555 - Repeat the above as necessary 
1555  - Transfer control of UAS to manual for landing 
1600  - Land 
 
Monday, 14 August, 2006:  Practice Flight 2 
 
0800  - GCS, Pelican Laptop, Ground Team Laptop and NPS UAS set-up, 
 connectivity and control checks 
0900  - NPS UAS Take-Off 
0910  - GCS assumes control (using SA) of UAS and establishes orbit over  
 runway 
0930  - John Glass (co-located at van), using Pelican laptop assumes control       
(using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of west end of RWY 28 to UAS 
and establishes orbit—practices target reconnaissance  
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0950  - Kent Landreth (co-located at van), using Ground Team laptop assumes  
 control (using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of resolution target to 
 UAS and establishes orbit—practices target reconnaissance 
1010  - GCS assumes control (using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of GCS to 
 UAS and establishes orbit 
1020-1055 - Repeat the above as necessary 
1055  - Transfer control of UAS to manual for landing 
1100  - Land 
 
Monday, 14 August, 2006:  Practice Flight 3 
 
1300  - GCS, Pelican Laptop, Ground Team Laptop and NPS UAS set-up, 
 connectivity and control checks 
1400  - NPS UAS Take-Off 
1410  - GCS assumes control (using SA) of UAS and establishes orbit over 
 runway 
1430  - John Glass (co-located at van), using Pelican laptop assumes control 
 (using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of resolution target to UAS and 
 establishes orbit—practices target reconnaissance 
1450  - Kent Landreth (co-located at van), using Ground Team laptop assumes 
 control (using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of west end of RWY 28 to 
 UAS and establishes orbit—practices target reconnaissance 
1510  - Control Van assumes control (using SA) of UAS and sends waypoint of 
 Control Van to UAS and establishes orbit 
1520-1555 - Repeat the above as necessary 
1555  - Transfer control of UAS to manual for landing 
1600  - Land 
1700  - Decision to TOC/Air Boss on which scenario to be flown on Tuesday 
1730 - Using Stitched Video from Raven – TOC Identifies Potential Target for 
further ISR flights—Tasks NPS UAS, Pelican and Ground Team to 
prepare for mission to be conducted Thursday (Tuesday if schedule is 
changed at the 1700 Update)  
1800 - Connectivity checks with static Pelican, Van and Ground Team in 
Tuesday configurations 
 
Tuesday, 15 August, 2006:  Tactical Horizon Extension 1  
 
0600  - Pelican Pre-flight, NPS UAS preparation and connectivity checks at  
  hanger with Van, Pelican, Ground Team and TOC 
0800  -  Ground Team “deploys” to west end of RWY 28 (maintains 50’ from  
  RWY) 
0800  - Pelican Departs—Establishes orbit over airfield 
0805  - GCS moves into position on RWY in preparation for UAS takeoff 
0815  - NPS UAS departs under manual control  
0820  - GCS takes control of UAS through SA and establishes orbit over airfield 
0830  - Pelican takes control of UAS using  SA and sends waypoint of resolution 
 target to UAS and establishes orbit—practices target reconnaissance 
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0845  - TOC identifies target via mesh video—requests ground eyes on and 
 further target recon 
0850  - Ground Team reports to TOC “eyes on” target requests UAS support;  
 gives current position 
0852  - TOC contacts Pelican—directs transition of UAS to Ground team 
 location 
0855  - Pelican sends Ground Team current position as waypoint to UAS  
0900  - Ground Team takes control through SA and sends target waypoint (res 
 target) to UAS 
0905  - Ground Team recons target area 
0920  - TOC acknowledges target information and directs RTB of UAS and 
 Pelican 
0930  - Pelican re-takes control of UAS and sends GCS waypoint and establishes 
 orbit over airfield 
0940  - GCS re-takes control of UAS and prepares for landing 
0950  - UAS lands clears runway  
1000  - Pelican Lands 
1030  - Hot Wash 
 
 
Thursday, 17 August, 2006:  Tactical Horizon Extension 2  
 
0600  - Pelican Pre-flight, NPS UAS preparation and connectivity checks at  
  hanger with Van, Pelican, Ground Team and TOC 
0745  - Ground Team “deploys” to OP (N35.45.294  W120.46.767) 
0800  - Pelican Departs—Establishes orbit at Pelican West Hold Point (location  
  TBD) 
0805  - GCS moves into position on RWY in preparation for UAS takeoff 
0815  - NPS UAS departs under manual control  
0820  - GCS takes control of UAS through SA and establishes orbit over airfield 
0830  - Pelican takes control of UAS using SA and sends waypoint of  target 
 (N35.45.347  W120.46.394) to UAS  
0845  - UAS establishes orbit over target—Pelican begins target recon 
0855  - TOC identifies target via mesh video—requests ground eyes on and 
 further target recon 
0900  - Ground reports to TOC “eyes on” target requests UAS support gives, 
 current position 
0903  - TOC contacts Pelican—directs transition of UAS to Ground team  
0905  - Pelican sends West Holding position (Location TBD) as waypoint to 
 UAS  
0910  - Ground team takes control through SA and sends target waypoint  
 (N35.45.347  W120.46.394) to UAS 
0915  - Ground Team recons target area 
0925  - TOC acknowledges target information and directs RTB of UAS and 
 Pelican 
0930  - Ground Team sends West Hold Point (Location TBD) waypoint to UAS 
0935  - Pelican re-takes control of UAS and sends airfield waypoint to UAS 
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0945  - GCS re-takes control of UAS and prepares for landing 
0950  - UAS lands clears runway/GCS clears runway  
1000  - Pelican Lands 
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